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A21-year-old hardworking student from Xidian University in Xi’an,Wei Zexi 魏则西, has been at the centre of public discussion sincehis death in April 2016. When diagnosed with end-stage synovial
sarcoma back in 2014, Wei and his family searched for more information
on ways to treat the seemingly incurable disease. Baidu, the largest Internet
search engine in China, naturally became a useful channel for information.
The family’s search on Baidu linked them to the Second Hospital of Beijing
Armed Police Corps, ranked a “Grade A tertiary hospital” (sanji jiadeng 三级
甲等), the highest ranking in the Chinese hospital classification scheme. Wei
and his family were assured by a doctor at the hospital that there was a
very high chance of saving Wei’s life after rounds of medical treatment
called cellular immunotherapy. The doctor’s indication of collaboration with
Stanford University in the United States further raised the hope of Wei’s
family. However, the treatment also put the family in massive debt with its
extraordinary cost. When Wei’s medical condition deteriorated, the doctor
in charge revoked his previous claims about the success rate of the treat-
ment and was found to have lied about collaboration with the renowned
university. Wei and his family felt deceived by the hospital as well as Baidu.
Before his death, Wei posted a long article on the Internet in February 2016,
blaming Baidu for “doing evil” with its information rank bidding service
(jingjia paiming竞价排名) and expressing his grievance against the hospital
and the doctor in charge without revealing their names. (1) When he passed
away on 12 April, his tragic story stirred up a huge public outcry on social
media originating with the question-and-answer platform Zhihu 知乎. Pub-
lic concern over the death of Wei Zexi was enormous, with 370 million peo-
ple having read about the case on the social media platform Weibo as of 7
May. (2) Initially, heavy criticism was directed towards Baidu. State-run media
such as People’s Daily and China Daily criticised Baidu for a business model
lacking in “social responsibility” and made a general call for improvements
in state regulation. (3) Baidu’s commercial competitors also joined this round
of attack on Baidu. (4) The Propaganda Department of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP), however, soon caused the case to die down on 4 May by
urging related media to delete posts that “take the opportunity to attack
the Party, the Government, the medical system, and the social system.”
Some news articles covering the scandal about the military hospital could
no longer be read from then on. (5)
Meanwhile, various government departments took action to ease public
discontent in early May. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), Na-
tional Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), and State Admin-
istration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) launched a joint investigation
into Baidu on 2 May, followed by state directives demanding a re-organi-
sation of Baidu’s search page and modification of its information rank bid-
ding service. (6)
The NHFPC and Central Military Commission (CMC) also looked into the
operation of the Second Hospital of Beijing Armed Police Corps on 3 May.
All collaboration between military-operated hospitals and private medical
companies was suspended. Several officials in the hospital were disciplined
after publication of the investigation report. (7) There have also been calls
for termination of paid services provided by the military. (8)
Indeed, the Wei Zexi Incident combines a number of problems that have
long existed with Baidu and healthcare reform in China. It ignited heated
discussion amongst the general public and experts, notably on the circula-
tion of online medical advertisements without proper regulation, the lack
of transparency about the outsourcing of medical departments of military-
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run hospitals to private medical companies, the quality of which is often in
serious doubt, and the limits of the recent round of healthcare reform. This
article will provide an overview of these discussions.
Baidu and the Putian Clan in the private
healthcare sector
Established in 1999, Baidu has gradually become China’s dominant Inter-
net search engine and now takes up the lion’s share of the Internet search
market. In 2015, Baidu enjoyed 92.1% market penetration and carved out
as much as 80% of the advertising revenue in the Chinese Internet mar-
ket. (9) Its business model relies principally on revenue generated from online
advertisements through its rank bidding service, with as much as 98% of
its total revenue coming from this source. (10) To satisfy the licensing re-
quirements of the Chinese government, Baidu also developed a powerful
internal department to censor illegal and political messages and took up a
surveillance role on behalf of the state. Its censorship work was so successful
that Baidu once received the “Self-Discipline Award” for its contribution to
“harmonious and healthy Internet development.” (11) It is beyond doubt that
Baidu maintains a close relationship with the government. While Baidu
made every effort to keep the Internet clear of messages undesirable to the
government, its effort to clean up misleading information for Chinese In-
ternet users was not of comparable magnitude. Some previous incidents
also suggest that Baidu knowingly compromised Internet users’ access to
authentic information in return for profits from the healthcare sector. Back
in 2008, CCTV broadcast an in-depth investigation into Baidu employees
helping unlicensed medical companies to circumvent laws that prohibit
them from advertising online. (12) A few months before the Wei Zexi Incident
in January 2016, Baidu was also found selling healthcare companies the
moderation rights for some online medical information forums (Baidu Tieba
百度贴吧) without notifying the public of these arrangements. Reports show
that these paying forum moderators removed posts unfavourable to their
companies, (13) putting the neutrality of the online platform moderator into
serious doubt and generating much criticism from social media and state-
run media alike. (14)
From this perspective, the tragic death of Wei Zexi reveals the long-existing
discontent of the Chinese public towards the business practices of Baidu, and
its complex relationship with the medical companies that put advertisements
on its platform. Some Chinese netizens are frustrated that only paid informa-
tion appears on the search result pages due to the ranking bidding service,
and they’re disappointed with Baidu’s reluctance to check the authenticity
of the medical information on its platform, criticising the company for putting
profit above social responsibility. Chinese Internet users did show a high ex-
pectation for Baidu to assume the role of a public-interest guardian that pro-
vides objective and reliable information on its platform. In an online survey
by Sina News, nearly half of Chinese netizens thought Baidu should not accept
advertisements from medical companies, and nearly 40% thought Baidu
should examine the quality of hospitals that place advertisements. (15)
There is a reason for Baidu’s reluctance to satisfy Chinese netizens on
this point: private healthcare companies actually contribute significantly
to Baidu’s advertising revenue. After the Wei Zexi Incident, Baidu sus-
pended its business cooperation with medical companies and was forced
to reduce its revenue forecast in June. (16)
Baidu has in particular collaborated with a cluster of private medical
companies and hospitals owned by people from the city of Putian, com-
monly known as the “Putian Clan” (Putian ji 莆田系). They constitute an
enormous force in the healthcare industry, as over 80% of private med-
ical companies in China have been found to be affiliated with the Putian
Clan. (17) The members of the Putian Clan have also organised themselves
into a chamber of commerce called “Putian (Chinese) Health Industry
Association” (Putian [Zhongguo] jiankang chanye zong shanghui 莆田
[中国] 健康产业总商会) since 2014, and in April 2015 gathered to discuss
how to bargain with Baidu over its high charges for information rank bid-
ding. (18) The temporary suspension of collaboration between the Putian
Clan and Baidu after the Wei Zexi Incident had a detrimental impact on
their business. In an interview with the media, a former shareholder of a
Putian-clan medical company, Chen Yuanfa 陈元发 , revealed that the
business operations of Putian Clan hospitals rely heavily on exaggerated
advertisements on the Internet to attract customers. (19) These hospitals
are well aware of the importance of branding and packaging. Doctors in
their hospitals are usually presented to the public with impressive pro-
fessional credentials. Appearances by some well-promoted doctors on a
variety of mass media platforms, including CCTV, are highlighted in ad-
vertisements. 
The overarching goal of profit maximisation for these private healthcare
companies severely undermines the professionalism of their doctors. Some
doctors previously employed by Putian Clan hospitals explained that people
working in the hospital are under such enormous pressure to achieve profit
targets set by their superiors that appealing to patients’ fear or deceptive
strategies may be needed. (20) As doctors are directly employed by the hos-
pitals they serve, it is not uncommon for unnecessary medical treatments
to be suggested to patients in these hospitals. 
80 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 6 / 4
Current affairs
9. “Airui Zixun: Baidu shichang fene xiajiang” (I-Research Inc.: Baidu’s market share drops), Caijing,
10 March 2009, www.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-10/110117165.html (accessed on 16 August
2016). 
10. Li Yan, He Chunmei, Qu Yunxu, Zhaohan, and Chen Jiahui, “Putian ji + Baidu: wei qian si guo, you
wei qian zai yiqi” (Putian Clan and Baidu: Broke up for money, and reunited for money), Caixin, 3
May 2016, http://datanews.caixin.com/2016-05-03/100939274.html (accessed on 2 September
2016).
11. Rebecca Mackinnon, “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism’,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 22, No.
2, 2011, pp. 32-46.
12. “Bashing Baidu: State Television Fires on China’s Google,” The Economist, 27 August 2011,
www.economist.com/node/21526943 (accessed on 22 October 2016); “How Baidu Won China,”
Bloomberg Businessweek, 12 November 2010, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-11-
11/how-baidu-won-china (accessed 22 October 2016).
13. Shu Pengqian, “Baidu Criticized for Selling Hemophilia Support Group to Top Bidder,” Beijing Today,
5 February 2016, https://beijingtoday.com.cn/2016/02/baidu-criticized-for-selling-hemophilia-
support-group-to-top-bidder (accessed on 2 September 2016).
14. “Baidu Tieba jiaoting shangye hezuo hou fengbo weiting” (The storm is not yet over after Tieba
of Baidu completely stopped commercial cooperation), Xinhua, 14 January 2016,
www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/caiyan/ksh/128.htm (accessed on 18 August 2016). 
15. “Baidu Scandal Brings Business Ethics to the Forefront,” What’s on Weibo, 3 May 2016, www.what-
sonweibo.com/baidu-scandal (accessed 23 October 2016).
16. “Chinese Search Engine Giant Baidu Cuts Revenue Forecast,” Reuters, 13 June 2016,
www.reuters.com/article/baidu-forecast-idUSL4N1953X1 (accessed on 18 August 2016).
17. See, for example, Zhang Yue and Wang Leping, “Putian ji: youyi zhong cheng wangguo – Zhongguo
de minying yiyuan bacheng du shi tamen de” (Putian Clan: Wandering doctors become a kingdom
– eighty percent of private hospitals in China belong to them), Southern Weekly, 22 May 2014,
www.infzm.com/content/100863 (accessed on 12 August 2016). 
18. Li Yan, He Chunmei, Qu Yunxu, Zhaohan, Chen Jiahui, “Putian ji + Baidu: wei qian si guo, you wei
qian zai yiqi” (Putian Clan and Baidu: broke up for money, and reunited for money), art. cit.
19. “Putian ji gongsi bei pu he 80 yu jundui yiyuan hezuo shouru shiduoyi” (Putian Clan companies
revealed to collaborate with more than 80 military-operated hospitals with revenue over 1 billion
RMB), IFeng, 4 May 2016, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160504/48672362_0.shtml (accessed on
14 August 2016). 
20. Chai Huiqun, “Tamen shi zai biliangweichang pu ji yisheng zi jie yiyuan xi jin shu” (They are forcing
us to be immoral: Putian Clan doctors revealed how hospitals make money), Southern Weekly,
12 May 2016, www.infzm.com/content/117026 (accessed on 12 August 2016). 
In a competitive Internet market with no governmental favouritism, In-
ternet users can choose the service of other Internet companies for infor-
mation, while the Internet companies also have a greater incentive to
provide information as accurate and reliable as possible to gain credibility
in the eyes of users. Such an environment does not exist in the Chinese In-
ternet market, however. The departure of Google from China in 2010 left
Baidu the unchallenged dominant player in the Chinese Internet market.
The fact that Baidu has a very sensitive political censorship system but is
reluctant to establish a system to check harmful medical information could
be the source of Chinese netizens’ grievance towards Baidu. If it is too much
to ask Baidu to check the authenticity of online medical information, some
suggest turning to the state. Nevertheless, the next section will discuss how
the government has also failed to control the spread of inauthentic online
medical information for a long time. A media report revealed that this could
be attributed to behind-the-scene politicking between vested interests in
the Chinese Internet and the government. (21)
A grey area: Advertising law and medical
information on the Chinese Internet
The controversy begins with how to define “advertisement” in the search
results provided by Internet search engines. Baidu claims that information
provided by its rank bidding service is not the same as advertisement. While
search results returned by Baidu are noted with the word “Promotion” (tui-
guang 推广), the notice is criticised as rather unclear, or the entire page is
full of results of this nature. Despite the recent adoption of the “Advertising
Law” in 2015 (Guanggao fa 广告法) and the “Measures for the Management
of Medical Advertisements” (Yiliao guanggao guanli banfa 医疗广告管理办
法), it is not clear whether they are applicable to the content of medical in-
formation on the Internet in the case of Baidu. The SAIC, which oversees
advertising in China, did not give a clear answer about what is regarded as
online advertisement until the recent promulgation of “Temporary Measures
for the Management of Internet Advertisements” (Hulianwang guanggao
guanli zanxing banfa 互联网广告管理暂行办法) following the death of Wei
Zexi in August 2016. (22) With the Temporary Measures, the information pro-
vided by Baidu through its rank bidding service has finally been demarcated
as “advertisement,” and its content is thus subject to state scrutiny. Song
Yahui 宋亚辉 from the Law School of Nanjing University estimated that
over 90% of the current online medical advertisements would not have
been allowed by the authorities under the “Measures for the Management
of Medical Advertisements.” (23) He also expressed concern about the legal
definition of “advertisement promoter,” which includes the capacity to ver-
ify the content of the advertisement under the law. If it is impracticable for
Internet service providers to verify the authenticity of content supplied by
paying clients, it may leave a potential loophole for Internet companies to
evade their legal responsibility. (24)
Inaction by both the government and the Internet giants has prompted
citizens to call for the removal of harmful medical information from the In-
ternet. Since January 2016, 36 public-interested groups in the healthcare
sector have joined together and reported Baidu to the SAIC for the massive
circulation of harmful medical information on the Internet. They also es-
tablished the “Public-interest Alliance for Fighting Against False Medical Ad-
vertisement on the Internet” (Hulianwang yiliao guanggao dajia gongyi
lianmeng 互联网医疗广告打假公益联盟) and have raised concerns about
the issue with petition campaigns, filing cases with the SAIC, and seeking
help from delegates of both the National People’s Congress and the Chinese
People’s Political Consultation Conference. (25)
The Chinese healthcare system and the
People’s Liberation Army
In addition to Baidu, military-run hospitals are another entity involved in
the Wei Zexi Incident. While public access to military-run hospitals can serve
to supplement the limited public resources in medical service provision, the
crux of the issue lies in the non-transparency of the collaboration between
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and private medical companies, which
use the military’s brand for business without acknowledging it to the public. 
In recent years, being sick in China is usually compounded by two salient
issues: the high cost of curing diseases (kanbing gui 看病贵) and the diffi-
culty of seeing (quality) doctors (kanbing nan 看病难). From a structural
perspective, the phenomenon can be attributed to the inadequate input of
public resources into the healthcare system in general and the disparity in
resource allocation across different levels of governments and regions. (26)
Since 1985, the public healthcare system has been reformed in the direction
of marketisation. Government subvention of the healthcare system has
been shrinking, and local governments are responsible for footing a larger
proportion of healthcare bills. (27) In this context, local governments are
under financial pressure to provide quality healthcare service with limited
resources. Public hospitals are thus required to explore financial resource
alternatives to governmental subvention, resulting in the semi-for-profit
nature of public hospitals and contributing to rising medical costs for pa-
tients. Meanwhile, the allocation of limited healthcare resources is highly
concentrated in a few top-tier hospitals in wealthy cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai. Patients across China have a general impression that com-
munity-level healthcare clinics have less-qualified medical facilities and
doctors, whereas provincial-level hospitals are equipped with better medical
facilities and doctors who are considered more trustworthy in terms of
healthcare quality and medical standards. This impression results in long
queues of patients from all over China at those hospitals, making it hard to
secure an appointment with doctors. 
The marketisation of the healthcare system in China was supposed to al-
leviate the above situation through the introduction of private capital into
the system so that a greater variety of both medical treatments and prices
could be made available to patients. However, this goal has yet to be
achieved.
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Since the 1990s, private healthcare companies owned by the Putian Clan
have made a fortune by specialising in skin-related diseases and illnesses
not covered by medical insurance, a niche market that cannot be satisfied
by the public sector. They have also managed to cooperate with public hos-
pitals by renting medical departments in some public hospitals for business
purposes. Nevertheless, the State Council issued “Opinions Regarding the
Implementation of Urban Medical Institute Separate Management”
(Guanyu chengzhen yiliao jigou fenlei guanli de shishi yijian 关于城镇医疗
机构分类管理的实施意见) to discourage public-private collaboration in the
form of medical department outsourcing in 2000. The then Ministry of
Health (MoH) also made a fresh round of strikes against this kind of pub-
lic-private collaboration in 2004. (28)
To subsidise military-run hospitals and train up doctors in those hospitals,
the Central Military Commission (CMC) has allowed hospitals under its
management to participate in the healthcare market and to provide paid
services to civilians since the 1990s. Due to the special status of the military
in China’s political system, these military-operated hospitals were free from
regulation by the civilian MoH. As a result, the military continued to coop-
erate with Putian Clan companies in the form of outsourcing medical de-
partments until the breakout of Wei Zexi Incident. While private-public
collaboration is not necessarily harmful to patients, the military-private
deals were usually sealed without transparency and through guanxi (per-
sonal connections) between military officials and the Putian Clan. (29) Not
only can deals of this nature become hotbeds of corruption, but lack of
knowledge of these deals misleads the public about the nature and quality
of the medical treatment they can expect to receive. Wei Zexi is one of the
victims of misplaced trust in this special type of public hospital. In fact,
among his many measures to reform the military, Xi Jinping announced the
phased termination of the military’s practice of offering paid services before
the Wei Zexi Incident in March 2016. (30) However, progress on this front
has been slow, and only after the incident did the military announce the
implementation of pilot schemes aimed at terminating paid services. (31)
The limits of marketisation in healthcare
reform
In 2009, the “New Healthcare Reform” was kick-started by the State Coun-
cil with the promulgation of “Opinions Regarding the Deepening of Health-
care Institutional Reform” (Guanyu shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige de
yijian 关于深化医药卫生体制改革的意见). The “Opinions” emphasised the
importance of for-profit private medical institutions in the healthcare sys-
tem as a supplementary force to the non-profit public medical institu-
tions. (32) While the New Healthcare Reform confirms the continued
marketisation of the healthcare sector, scholars discussed the limits of for-
mer marketisation strategies in light of the Wei Zexi Incident. Their discus-
sions reveal in part why the general public might have little trust in private
medical companies and why problems in the healthcare sector persist.
Nie Riming 聂日明 from the Shanghai Institute of Finance and Law
pointed out that problems with healthcare reform are the result of both
over-regulation and under-regulation of the healthcare sector. (33) Concern-
ing over-regulation, Zhu Hengpeng 朱恒鹏 from the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences argued that the core problem with China’s healthcare reform
rests with the failure to separate the state’s role in setting rules for the
healthcare sector from that of operating semi-for-profit public hospitals
(guanban bu fen 管办不分). The dual objective of the state allows it to pre-
vent low-performing public hospitals from dropping out of the market by
maintaining high market entry thresholds for competitors from the private
sector. (34) Zhu further argued that the “administrative monopoly” of the
public sector helps secure the appropriation of limited medical resources
(e.g. universal health insurance) by the public sector, which renders the pri-
vate sector under-developed in terms of quality. Moreover, Nie argued that
the limited permits granted to private medical companies under this “ad-
ministrative monopoly” are usually not based on the credentials of the com-
panies but rather on the guanxi of company owners with government
officials. (35) The fact that the Putian Clan has been very eager to establish
guanxi with government officials and that more than 80% of private med-
ical companies are related to the Putian Clan (36) may provide good support
for this claim. In such a distorted marketisation process, it is unlikely that
patients will have the same confidence in the quality of private medical
companies as they do in public hospitals. Although 47% of hospitals were
privately owned in China in 2013, they accounted for only 14% of hospital
beds and accommodated only 10% of all Chinese patients. (37)
In addition to the problem of over-regulation to protect vested interests,
the medical treatment with cellular immunotherapy received by Wei Zexi
was not properly regulated despite the state’s acknowledgement of its po-
tential danger to patients. Initially, cellular immunotherapy products were
put under the supervision of the China Food and Drug Administration
(CFDA) until 2005, when the heads of the CFDA were removed on graft
charges. (38) The regulative function was later transferred to the MoH, but
virtually no regulation was enforced until 2009, when the Ministry promul-
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gated “Measures of Medical Technology Clinical Application Management”
(Yiliao jishu linchuang yingyong guanli banfa 医疗技术临床应用管理办法).
Cellular immunotherapy was then listed under the “Third Category of Med-
ical Technology,” indicating its potential moral hazard and high risk. (39) How-
ever, there is plentiful evidence that the MoH did not play a gatekeeping
role, (40) and the clinical use of cellular immunotherapy spread across China
for years without proper state monitoring. 
A new measure in 2015 to regulate potentially hazardous medical tech-
nologies added more puzzles to the oversight over cellular immunotherapy.
Under the new measure, medical institutions no longer need to apply for
approval when using the Third-category Medical Technologies on the “Re-
stricted List of Clinically Applied Medical Technology (2015 version)” (Xian-
zhi lichuang yingyong de yiliao jishu 2015 ban 限制临床应用的医疗技术
2015版). Those medical institutions are only required to document such
use to the NHFPC and will be held responsible if anything goes wrong. The
result of the change is twofold. First, it leaves a grey area concerning
whether the use of cellular immunotherapy is clinically acceptable since
2015. Second, as Li Qing from the Development Centre for Medical Science
and Technology of the NHFPC noted, the change indicates the transfer of
supervisory responsibility from the NHFPC to medical institutions that pur-
sue the clinical use of the Third-category Medical Technologies. (41) The prob-
lem of inadequate state supervision did not raise concern until the death
of Wei Zexi, after which the NHFPC clarified the status of cellular im-
munotherapy as “clinical research” and ordered a complete suspension of
its use. (42) While the technology of cellular immunotherapy may not be nec-
essarily harmful to patients, the apparent lack of proper state supervision
fails to guarantee a safety standard that protects the lives of patients who
seek such treatment in China, and reduces the credibility of public and pri-
vate hospitals alike, given their increasingly convergent source of revenue
from profit-making services provided to the public.
Concluding remarks
The Wei Zexi Incident has unearthed a number of critical issues regarding
the Chinese Internet as well as healthcare reform in the direction of mar-
ketisation. In the past, the Putian Clan medical conglomerate benefited from
the grey zone of advertising law when it disseminated questionable medical
information on the Internet with the help of Baidu. The lack of a credible
mechanism to verify medical information online has made Internet users
vulnerable to deception. In the name of alleviating the burden of public hos-
pitals, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also outsourced medical depart-
ments of hospitals under its management to private medical companies,
removed from civilian oversight due to its special status in the political sys-
tem until the Wei Zexi Incident. The lack of transparency in such public-pri-
vate collaboration has also confused the public about the for-profit nature
and poor quality of medical treatment, which they do not expect from a
public hospital. Furthermore, the continued inadequacy of public money for
healthcare service provision provided incentives for the government to over-
regulate the medical market by setting a high threshold for market entry
so as to limit competition from the private sector. The lack of enforcement
and clarity of health-related laws also leads to public safety being compro-
mised by under-regulation of hazardous medical technology. 
In retrospect, the Wei Zexi Incident was significant in that it served as a
catalyst for the government to clear up some grey areas regarding medical
information on the Internet and the regulation of medical technology, and
it quickened the pace of phasing out paid services provided by the military
to a certain extent. The government’s responses have been more assertive
and visible this time, with actions to prevent the circulation of misleading
medical information and to salvage the image of public hospitals with in-
vestigations. 
Furthermore, some observations are worth noting from the Wei Zexi In-
cident. First, in the absence of trustworthy medical information online, Chi-
nese netizens expect the Internet giant Baidu to act beyond its core business
and take up some state functions such as checking the authenticity of med-
ical information listed on its platform, especially given its close relations
with the Chinese government and its powerful censorship system, which
filters politically sensitive messages. (43) The continued lack of authoritative
agents to verify medical information on the Internet is not conducive to
empowering Chinese citizens with trustworthy medical knowledge from
their online surfing experience, and by no means eases the heightened ten-
sion between patients and doctors in today’s Chinese society. Second, the
current healthcare reform does not encourage quality private medical com-
panies to join the healthcare market to alleviate the overloaded demand
for public hospitals in top-tier cities. With the “administrative monopoly”
of the semi-for-profit public healthcare sector and the opaque operation of
military-run hospitals in place, it is the guanxi of the owners of private med-
ical companies with government officials, not the credentials of the health-
care institutions they represent, that earn them a place in the healthcare
market. This situation not only contributes to the monopolisation of the
private healthcare sector by the Putian Clan, but also discourages the de-
velopment of quality medical services provided by private medical compa-
nies. All in all, the current state of healthcare reform is not conducive to
building a trusting doctor-patient relationship, since patients tend to doubt
doctors’ professionalism due to profit-oriented behaviour in both public and
private hospitals.
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